Indeed. I recall reading somewhere, although typically I can't locate it at the moment, that one of the topics of conversation during their meeting was Rommel asking Dietrich what his reaction would be if there were to be some sort of change in leadership. His response was along the lines of "You're my superior officer, I'll follow your orders". Without going too deep into fantasy theories if true this conversation might have warranted a return to a more secure environment than a forward command post. Lang mentioned an enemy breakthrough (St Lô??) as being the reason for the urgency to get back to la Roche Guyon. Of course, Dietrich's response could have been fabricated after the fact in an attempt to show he wasn't a fanatical Nazi. I don't know, I never met the guy. He was apparently "decent but stupid" accordding to von Rundstedt... For what it's worth I concur the newspaper article indeed does show Dietrich's car, the propaganda folks putting the twist Niels referred to onto the story, ie they couldn't hide the fact that Allied air atacks occurred but they could show how "ineffective" they were. Another interesting slant is the mentioning that civilians helped Dietrich. The level of willingness isn't elaborated upon... Anyway, I digress.... Urville is correct for I.SS Pz Korps. I did find one example... Michael Reynolds book "Steel Inferno" states that village as the location for the meeting. Cheers, Sean
Hi All, I agree Niels, the likelihood of this being a photograph of Rommel's car is very low in my view. Almost everything seems to reduce the possibility further. To an extent yes, but I think the people who 'parrot' the original ATB article/attack location are probably trying to reduce two unknowns (who and where) to one unknown (who) to make their angle fit with an ORB account of where 'their' pilot was operating on the 17th July. I don't have a particular problem with these 'parrot' articles provided they insert something at the end like '...we will probably never know for sure'. The problems arise when this is not done; then these articles, with their built in assumptions, go unquestioned and are then taken as 'proof' positive as to what happened. I would therefore encourage people to put their observations and points forward on this and other forums. 'Research' with an agenda is very easy to spot - the big giveaway is when the author gets offended when it is questioned The location of the car photo... I like John's idea about a railway connection. Does anyone know the meaning of the lower symbol on the signpost, arrowed red below? I presume the upper symbol 'X' just means a junction? Regards, Pat
Glad there is agreement on two things: - the car in the magazine is not Rommel's car [I recommend starting a new thread on that incident, to keep this thread clear] - the HQ was at Urville The latter is the most important since it means Rommel needed to travel at least an extra 21,5km (according to GE). This has an effect on the timeline. I find it hard to estimate how much influence this would have had, but it needs to be considered. BTW, I've also read Rommel visited the 276. and 277.Inf.Div. that day. Both were west of Caen, which means he could have come through Urville on his way to St. Pierre s. Dives. ;-) So meeting at St. Pierre would require a very good reason... What's the original source of the St. Pierre claim? Does not seem to be supported by much. Travelling back to his HQ, may have been simply a matter of having started his day trip there. Communications with OB West would probably have been better there as well. BTW, already on the morning of 17 July the AOK7 KTB does mention significant pressure in the St-Lô sector and a possible need to pull back the front there. These might be the events Rommel wanted to get a grip on. The Dietrich incident. In scanning some books online, the most interesting story is that Dietrich warned Rommel because his own car had been strafed a few days earlier. If correct, this confirms my suspicion that incident occured a few days earlier. As for the traffic sign. It might be a warning sign for a train. Basically a triangle with a locomotive inside it.
Hello all, I think after all that the St Pierre sur Dives connection is just misinterpretation..... If they took the road from Urville towards Livarot then that would take you through St Pierre sur Dives. If Lang or anyone else was describing the route and the need to take minor roads near Livarot they might well say "after leaving St Pierre....". Reading that on it's own would suggest St Pierre is the start point, not just the last major village/town they passed through before taking the described "smaller roads" route. In other words, it's just a reference point. Does this make sense? It's not the original source but could possibly poiint to how it arose. With the sign, Niels is right, I think, a locomotive. The other sign it could be near a level crossing would be a gate, indicating "gated crossing". The large diagonal cross though means "un-gated" so negates that possibility. At least based on my understanding of these things.... Sean
Hi Guys, Can we safely say that the sign post is French and the 'Halt' sign was added by the Germans? From this Wiki page, the modern day French sign post means 'Crossroads ahead with priority to the right'. If it meant the same in 1944, is the car on a minor road just before a crossroads with a major road or railway line running left/right? Regards, Pat
hello Dean These comments about range/endurance "I just thought of something that you may find very interesting, Pat. Do you recall the reason Mustangs proved so successful? I think the answer is key to your important question regarding the value of the Mustang pilot. The answer may be their legs. The Mustang was designed to provide the same if not better killing power as the Spitfire, but with longer legs - more endurance - greater range. The Mustangs were able to escort the bombers much deeper into enemy territory than ever before. Now this all makes sense to me. I, too, was a bit put off by what seems like a bit of an arrogant response in Rohmer's explanation, but the Mustang's endurance and range means they were of much greater value, the longer they were in the air and over the battlefield, calling in the targets. Imagine if they were told to engage a ground target - there would be significant risk they would only see one target and then be shot down. That's not good return for investment. I hope you see what it is I am trying to explain." apply to the Packard-Merlin version of the Mustang (the III/IV in RAF terminology), not the Allison version, which was not used for that purpose either by the USAAF or the RAF (and associated units Poles/Canadians etc.). They were originally issued to army-co-operation squadrons in the RAF/RCAF and then kept in that role when AC Command was disbanded on 1 June 1943 and all AC squadrons transferred to Fighter Command, and then absorbed into the Tactical Air Force (which later became 2TAF), and replaced by the Spitfire IX and XIV in the F.R. role as we ran out of the Allison version. Later versions (Mustang III then much later the Mustang IV) became available (around January '44) and they were issued to 2TAF fighter squadrons, and then when the Mustang III squadrons of 122 Wing came home in September '44, after being replaced by Tempest V's (who had finished chasing V1's), they were re-roled as bomber escorts for the increasing numbers of BC daylight bomber raids, in the same manner that the US 8th Fighter Command escorted the US heavies - however, in the case of RAF BC, they flew more as a loose gaggle than the way that the disciplined US Bomb Divisions did, which must have made them harder to escort, but that is not the point of our quest though!! regards Allan
Think you may well be correct about that Sean. Lang's original account could solve this. Would again show how important it is to understand the context of any document or account. Looking at the full photo of Dietrich's car again, I'm having trouble seeing anything that look like an actual railroad. However, "HALTE" is probably short for 'Haltestelle', a place where trains, trams or busses stop to let people on or off.
Pat, You're right, I hadn't realised it's within a circle. Teach me to work on the computer without my glasses.... Only problem is it's a light cross on a dark background, which I'm not familiar with..... Sean
In another effort to respond to some of the important questions reflecting doubt in Major General Rohmer's self-description of reconnaissance as invaluable or too valuable to be risked engaging MET targets, this depiction of the order of battle tends to show us two things: in comparison to the vast number of assets dedicated to attack, the short list of reconnaissance assets does indeed support claims as to their very high value; and, with comparitively few assets devoted to reconnaissance, it makes sense that they not be risked unnecessarily so as to remain overhead for as long as possible...:0) ORDER OF BATTLE 6th JUNE 1944 No 83 Group 39 (RCAF) Reconnaissance Wing 400 (RCAF) Squadron Spitfire IX SP 168 Squadron Mustang I 414 (RCAF) Squadron Mustang I RU 430 (RCAF) Squadron Mustang I G9 15 Sector 122 Wing 19 Squadron Mustang III QV 65 Squadron Mustang III YT 122 Squadron Mustang III MT 125 Wing 132 Squadron Spitfire IX FF 453 (RAAF) Squadron Spitfire IX FU 602 Squadron Spitfire IX LO 129 Wing 184 Squadron Typhoon IB BR 17 Sector 124 Wing 181 Squadron Typhoon IB EL 182 Squadron Typhoon IB XM 247 Squadron Typhoon IB ZY 126 Wing 401 (RCAF) Squadron Spitfire IX YO 411 (RCAF) Squadron Spitfire IX DB 412 (RCAF) Squadron Spitfire IX VZ 127 Wing 403 (RCAF) Squadron Spitfire IX KH 416 (RCAF) Squadron Spitfire IX DN 421 (RCAF) Squadron Spitfire IX AU 143 Wing 438 (RCAF) Squadron Typhoon IB F3 439 (RCAF) Squadron Typhoon IB 5V 440 (RCAF) Squadron Typhoon IB I8 144 Wing 441 (RCAF) Squadron Spitfire IX 9G 442 (RCAF) Squadron Spitfire IX Y2 443 (RCAF) Squadron Spitfire IX Z1 22 Sector 121 Wing 174 Squadron Typhoon IB XP 175 Squadron Typhoon IB HH 245 Squadron Typhoon IB MR 83 Group Reserve with ADGB 64 Squadron Spitfire V SH 234 Squadron Spitfire V AZ 303 (Polish) Squadron Spitfire V RF 345 (French) Squadron Spitfire Vb 2Y 350 (Belgian) Squadron Spitfire Vb MN 402 (Canadian) Squadron Spitfire V AE 501 Squadron Spitfire V SD 611 Squadron Spitfire V FY
Outstanding work, Pat. I am so grateful. This helps me to understand a staff car was indeed heading south. It also encourages me to continue questioning the Miller footage if only because in the Miller footage all the property lines seem perpendicular to the main thoroughfare, while in Pat's images, and maps and photos from ATB the property lines in question seem more obtuse rather than perpendicular. Great work. Dean
Hello Dean If you were making reference to my comments in "In another effort to respond to some of the important questions reflecting doubt in Major General Rohmer's self-description of reconnaissance as invaluable or too valuable to be risked engaging MET targets..." I repeat here my comment "I would rather see the official 2TAF document with this instruction than accept 100% a piece in the memoirs of Major-General (ret) Rohmer, not that I am doubting the accuracy of the piece..." and that still stands as I have no reason to doubt what Major-General (ret) Rohmer wrote, I only seek official confirmation. I was also surprised that you used a 6 June 1944 Order of Battle, which reflected the 12 May 1944 changes to 2TAF organisation, briefly explained here: 14/5/44 - 125 Wing ORB A letter from Group was received informing all concerned that the Airfield is now to be known as the WING, and the Wing changes it name to Sector. When in fact a major reorganisation had taken place in 2TAF on 14 July 1944, which, only just, pre-dated the attack on Rommel. (Strangely, the May '44 ORB was entitled "125 Wing Headquarters" above the 1 May 1944 entry, previously, of course, entitled 125 Airfield, although the changes did not take effect until 12 May.) Again, from the 125 Wing ORB 13/7/44 The Airfield Commander held his conference today at 1000 hours and announced that 15 Sector, our parent unit was to be broken up. The wing is to be self contained and to receive orders direct from G.C.C. it was also learned that W/C J. H. Lapsley O.B.E., D.F.C., who has commanded the wing since its formation at Gravesend in June 1943 is leaving. His place is to be taken by G/C Rankin, D.S.O. and Bar, D.F.C. and Bar. 14/7/44 15 Sector ceased to operate from first light this morning, this move being part of a reorganisation which is affecting the whole Group. G/C J. Rankin D.S.O. and Bar, D.F.C. and Bar assumes command of 125 Wing vice W/Cdr J. H. Lapsley, O.B.E., D.F.C. who is returning to England. 441 (CAN) squadron from 144 (W/C Johnson’s wing) joined 125 to-day and spent the rest of the day settling in. Sectors disappeared, and Wings were from then on under GCC control (83 Group "Kenway" - 84 Group "Longbow") - 144 (RCAF) Wing disbanded and the three RCAF squadrons 441 - 442 - 443 were posted to 125 Wing (441), 126 (RCAF) Wing (442) and 127 (RCAF) Wing (443), which then operated 4 Squadrons, as a consequence Wings became Group Captain commands, with a Wing Commander as the tactical leader (Wing Commander Operations). My background is as the son of a founder member of the Tactical Air Force, later 2 TAF, as he was there whilst it was still only an twinkle in somebodies eye! - a pre-war regular he served at "Z" Composite Group HQ during Exercise Spartan in March 1943, which evolved via Blue Group in to 83 (Composite) Group HQ on 1 April 1943, staying with them until 8 May 1944 when he was posted to 125 Airfield HQ - staying with 125 Airfield/Wing from RAF Ford to B.172 Husum/Germany, via B.160 Kastrup/Copenhagen - and then, after 125 Wing disbanded in July '45, back to Kastrup to serve on 122 Wing HQ, until that disbanded in turn in early September '45, then moving to RAF Sylt as part of BAFO. Personally I am hoping that we resolve this mystery in favour of 125 Wing, and most probably 602 (City of Glasgow) Squadron Aux. Air Force, but 100% proof has not as yet emerged as we are all fully aware!! Allan
Hi Dean In regard to Miller's account, I don't think anybody believes he was responsible for straffing Rommel. At least I don't. We only looked into his claim, the still photos, and the possibility of if he did. The photos seem to suggest an area different than the likely location of the Rommel incident. So we moved on. John
Wonderful, Allan. I am so pleased that the folks on this forum have command of such a vast and important pool of resources. My pool is severely limited, so I am benefiting enormously from your inputs. Having said that, I think my only purpose in sharing a (now out-of-date) ORB was to demonstrate the paucity of recce assets as compared to the attack assets, as but one element that could support Major General Rohmer's remarks about not being permitted to attack MET. Cheers and many, many thanks. Dean Very interesting, and helpful. I have a sense the work everyone is doing in here will far outclass anything that has come before. Accurate information on the German positions is essential, I think. I support the remarks about Dietrich's car, especially the idea of conveying how ineffective air attacks are against such targets. Propaganda, to be sure, and after Rommel's demise, some might have been eating their boots. Anyway, Yes, I do think there has been quite a bit of parroting; I hope we can get to the bottom of many issues related to this pivotal event. Might you have any comments about the markings on Rommel's front right fender, found on a picture on page 1 or 2 of this forum? I would be interested in your read of those markings. I think there is the number 15, or something... Dean
Hello everyone. My name is Ian Sayer and I am an occasional co-author of books on various aspects of WW2. One of my hobbies is collecting autograph material relating to WW2. I have been doing that for nearly 40 years. I am researching the story of the strafing of Rommel's car with a view to publishing an article later this year. I came across this forum recently and was very impressed with your discussions and analysis of the incident so I have now become a member and would like to reopen this thread. My idea is to attempt to reconstruct the events of that day piece by piece. I see it as a jigsaw puzzle so we may not see the complete picture for quite a while. Hopefully we may be able to solve this 71 year old mystery but if not it should be possible to tell the story more completely than it has been previously. I realise that there have been many claimants and that a process of elimination has to take place. I do have some information which I do not think has been published before. It is not 'smoking gun' but it might very well be helpful from a reconstruction point of view. If it's OK with you guys I would like to concentrate on one aspect at a time. If you are comfortable with this suggestion then I propose that we kick off with the question of the car and its occupants. If I make a statement which you feel is incorrect or requires explanation please do not hesitate to mention it. I am proceeding on the basis that contributors will already be aware of the dramatis personae so I will just use surnames but if anyone needs clarification just ask. I believe there were five people in the car at the time of the incident. These were Daniel the driver, Holke the air spotter, the two ADCs Lang and Neuhaus plus Rommel. According to one report Lang was in the 'jump' seat. Now where were they all sitting and in which direction were they facing? Thanks for your interest Ian
Hi Ian, You are very welcome to the Forum and we look forward with anticipation to any new insight which you may be able to bring to this thread. I presume the jump seat was part of the original design of the Horch and was therefore a pull out from the rear seat and facing forward? I may be wrong however. Regards, Pat
Welcome Ian - well the first bit is easy, the driver was facing forward (!!), and I expect that Rommel was as well - but as to whether he was seated next to Daniel, as seen in several photos, I have no idea. Good luck with your quest - I sincerely hope that you can come up with an answer, but the matter has been trawled over for many years without success - but who knows, you might have found the smoking gun! Good luck - and if I can be of assistance please ask. Whilst I hold the 125 Wing ORB, and the 602 Squadron ORB is held on this group, nothing conclusive shows, as strafing a car is simply that, strafing a car with no idea as to the occupants, and reported locations are not always 100% accurate. The Wing ORB does not contain up/down times, although sometimes times are given IIRC, and it is a precis of the Wings 4 constituent squadrons activities for the day. And quite often activities reported in the squadron ORB do not appear in the Wing ORB. Whether the squadron diarist sorted out what they wanted for pass upward, or the diarist at Wing sorted through the squadrons full days activities and pulled out the best bits, so to speak, I have no idea. And as to whether Group received both the Wing and Squadron ORB's for their daily log again I have no idea. Regards Allan
Good morning Allan, Thank you for your welcome. As I said in my post, the additional information I have is not 'smoking gun' but might prove useful in eliminating some claims. I appreciate that there has been a lot of activity concerning this incident over the years and I am not expecting miracles but having reviewed most of the coverage I think there is a gap for a more detailed account which is basically what I am proposing. In compiling that account it might be possible, by a more detailed process of elimination, to create what is only ever likely to be a circumstantial attribution. Anyway let's see how we get on. I will be making another post today regarding the Horch and its occupants. Regards Ian
Thanks for that Pat. Regarding the ‘jump seat’ the only mention of one I can find is the one referred to in your quote from the 2004 expanded edition of the ‘The Big Show’. There is no reference to the Rommel incident in the 1951 edition. I have had a quick look on the internet and, of course, there are several different variations of the Horch Command Car. One I noticed had two bench seats -one behind the driving compartment and the other serving as the rear seat. My inclination is to think that the jump seat may have been either a bench or a pulldown seat (like a London cab) behind the driver’s compartment facing the rear. Maybe we have a technical member who can comment more accurately on this? I have noticed some previous reservations on the accuracy of Clostermann’s work and I also don’t extend any credibility on the arrival of a great bevy of IO’s on the 17th. That could only have happened if 602 had been charged with a Kill Rommel’ mission and from the accounts I have seen it was simply a target of opportunity. However, that said, much of Clostermann’s subsequent account seems at least plausible. He is bang on with some of the lesser but verifiable details so I am inclined to give him the benefit of the doubt over his account of the German version of the incident. I wonder where he got it from. Perhaps part of an RAF report he (or his researcher) found in the 1975 NA release? In any event let’s see what he had to say. Clostermann says that Holke (the air observer) was sitting in the right hand passenger seat next to Daniel the driver who was on the left side. Rommel apparently often sat next to the driver (there are one or two photos which seem to confirm this). Lang, he said, was in the jump seat so he could keep an eye on the skies to the rear. Rommel, he says, was seated in the rear on the right side (behind Holke) with Neuhaus sitting to his left (behind Daniel) On the other hand, David Irving (who, apart from his well-known controversial perspectives, is still regarded by many as usually reliable when it comes to the uncontroversial minutiae of his work) implies that Rommel was sitting next to Daniel in the front. In the back, he says, next to Lang was a corporal (Holke) acting as an aircraft lookout. He doesn’t mention Neuhaus. From the Sources it is clear that Irving interviewed Lang in Germany and refers to a ‘Report on Rommel’s injury, July 17th 1944’ by Lang which he states is located in Munich’s Institute of Contemporary History along with an Affidavit for Sepp Dietrich dated 27th May 1950 that seems to relate to the Rommel incident. At the moment I can’t find any other references to the Command Car’s seating arrangements other than the clearly spurious account of an alleged eye witness – 2nd Lieutenant Heins – who claimed that Rommel was sitting to the right of the driver with two high ranking officers in the back. Rommel’s adjutants, he continued, were following in the second car. However, that does bring me on to a related issue. I have not as yet come across any references to escort cars. Obviously two Command Cars travelling together would be likely to attract more interest from the air than a single vehicle. However, one would have thought that outriders would also be likely to give the game away but on this point I note that Clostermann claims that a ‘Military Police motor-cyclist rode in front’. He subsequently attributes Jacques Remlinger as killing this motor cyclist ‘who had come to a halt’ at about the same time as the Horch left the road out of control. Of course this information could have been injected to support Remlinger’s subsequent ORB entry but embellishments like ‘the vehicle had mainly been hit by a number of 303 bullets, one of which came off the barrel of Neuhaus’ revolver and broke his hip’ are clearly unhelpful in terms of promoting the accuracy of other aspects of his account. Anyway I am looking forward to seeing the comments that this post (hopefully) elicits. Regards Ian
Hi Ian, The photos I've seen of Rommel in a vehicle didn't seem to give a clear picture because there is not a lot of photos to view, but in the Africa campaign, he seems to ride in the back of a staff car. but in France he seems to ride up front. Maybe it is just coincidence based on the few photos there are. Or maybe he liked to choose his seat based on the type of event he was going to. For instance maybe on long drives or official events or protocols he chose one seat and then maybe for more informal or casual events or shorter drives he chose another seat. I know it doesn't help, but maybe something to consider... John
Hello Ian With regard to Clostermann - if I tell you that 602 were not anywhere near to Cherbourg when the Munsterland was attacked, despite the interesting chapter, and the tussle in the stratosphere also doesn't stack up - let alone his post-war incident over in Denmark and the award of a Danish decoration, which are also disputed. Plus IIRC 602 changed from the Spitfire IXb to the Spitfire IXe, around this time (late July/early August) still fitted with 2 x 20mm cannon but the .303 had been changed to the .5 Browning. Not too sure on the date of the change, but it might be mentioned in the 602 ORB's in The Green Room", or for once Clostermann may be correct! With the threats from the resistance I would certainly expected that Rommel would have had some form of escort - to send somebody of his stature on journeys without escort would probably not have been permitted. I hold both the editions of The Big Show as Dad, who purchased the 1951 edition when it first came out, said that they gave the first mentions he had seen in print of the activities of 125 Airfield/Wing - although I am sure that they are not 100% accurate in either edition. regards Allan