323rd Bombardment Group, June 10, 1944 Clecy and Cerisy Forest Footage

Hi, Pat,

You've made an important point. Those who question the necessity of slowing the movement of German reinforcements through Caen needs to study the maps and look down from the cliffs of Normandy onto the beaches.

There are no records that would support the position that two of the four Caen bridges were the 323rd's primary target on the afternoon of D-Day.

The records would list the target as Caen Bridges. They don't.

The smallest munition the 323rd ever used to fell a bridge was 1,000 pound GP bombs with an impact fuse. More often, as was the case with each of the bridges over the Meuse near Liege (Liege, Liege-Valbenoit, Seraing), they dropped 2,00 pound GP bombs with impact fuses on bridges. The 323rd dropped 500 pound bombs in Caen.

Post war accounts of the missions flown by 323rd crews to three coastal gun batteries on the morning of D-Day describe the aircrews as having bombed from an altitude of about 1,500 feet. The records reflect that the 323rd's morning missions bombed from about 7,000 to 8,00 feet, or about 3,00 to 4,000 below the Marauder's normal bombing altitude. That was at dawn --- about 6:25 in the morning.

Conditions had worsened by about 4:15 in the afternoon, when the 323rd sent 36 White Tails to Road Junctions/Choke Points C-1 and C-2 in Caen. They made landfall at an altitude of 4,000 feet and bombed from 3,900 feet. That's 75% lower than their normal bombing altitude. This is significant.

Light flak can easily take an aircraft down at that altitude.

The intersections were very small targets --- probably Medieval city street width. They were probably not visible to them from 3,90 feet --- imagine flying over a labyrinth at low altitude.

Caen likely would have been regarded as a "hot" target. It wasn't a fortified target like Calais, Dieppe, Bolougne or Le Harve, but there were German troops stationed between the town and the beach. (Hence the navigation route.) Depending on how "hot" the target was, the lead bombardiers had between 25 and 45 seconds to identify the target and mentally solve the physics equation, consult his charts and correct the three dials on the bomb sight for drift (right and left of target due to wind) and altitude and air and ground speed.

The last mission that a Marauder group had flown at that altitude (Ijuiden) had resulted in the loss of 10 aircraft and aircrews out of 10. That would have been on their minds.

The June 6 photo showing smoke coming out of the St. Jean area had to have been from the Group Lead flight of four based on 9th AF bomb damage reports. The shape of the impact is a shallow wedge, which fits.

In studying the aerial photograph of the smoke billowing up, I don't believe their bombs quite made it was far north on the Rue Saint Jean as the cathedral. (The lead's bomb's probably landed around the intersection of the Rue de Carnes and the Rue Saint Jean.) So, they bombed what is described as a little "long". This probably means that Capt. Wolfendon corrected for drift (i.e., right or left to account for the cross wind), but must have run out of time in trying to correct for altitude and air speed. My guess is, he had a hard time identifying the target due to the low altitude and multistory buildings and maze of streets in the target area.

Finally, the low altitude would have affected the bombardiers' adjustments. They had zero practice correcting their bomb sights at that altitude.

It is important for everyone concerned to understand that Caen Road Junctions C-1 and C-2 represented a very different kind of target for the Marauder aircrews. The B-26 crews in England had gone from bombing airdromes (through Big Week in February 1944) to bombing marshaling yards (beginning in March 1944). Then, in the days just prior to the invasion, the Marauder crews took out all 18 bridges across the Seine below Paris and across the Loire below Orleans. And that does not include all of the other critical bridges they took down in a matter of a little over a week. These were not aircrews that bombed blind or fie bombed German cities. They could be and often were very accurate.

A bridge and a marshaling yard had to have been much easier to identify quickly than an intersection in the middle of a medieval city.The Marauder crews of the 323rd, and probably the other Marauder groups in England, had never bombed a target like that, much less any other target from that very low altitude and lived to tell about it.

There's been quite a bit of discussion online and in the literature over how many tons of bombs were dropped by the White Tails of the 323rd on Caen. I have not seen any that are correct, which is not to criticize what are very impressive and moving efforts to record what happened to Caen and its inhabitants. Similarly, the accounts of where the White Tails' bombs struck seem confused, perhaps due to the fog of war and time. Some of the accounts have included the 36 391st BG Marauders, who followed the 323rd into the town, as having been part of the 323rd.

In terms of the bombs that the 323rd dropped north of the Orne, the group lead flight's bombs (16,000 pounds) fell along the Rue Saint Jean just south of the CathedralSaint Jean and along, right and left of the Rue Saint Jean street/tramway. I believe the bombs of one of the other 323rd flights hit near and around the bleachers of the football stadium (which is now a larger vanue) just north of the Hippodrome, not too far from the Saint Savior Hospital (16,00 pounds). I believe, but need to confirm, that all but one of he other 323rd flights either did not bomb or dropped south of the river not far from a cemetery. So, the tonnage that's been attributed in writings to the White Tails is not accurate. (It appears that it was the 391st that bombed the St. Julien Quarter, unless the hospital noted above is included in that section of town, but I haven't run all of those details down.)

I'm in the process of writing the chapter(s) that will cover all of this. I'd hoped to send it to you via an email on the upcoming anniversary of D-Day, but I'm not going to have it done for at least several more weeks. So, with the anniversary fast approaching, I wanted to at least post this.

Jan

 

It’s been a long time since we studied the 323rd’s 6 June 1944 afternoon mission to Caen Road Junctions C-1 and C-2. As you know, Normandy in the Time of Darkness incorrectly identifies the 323rd’s targets as two of the four bridges over the Orne in the city center. The actual targets were two key junctions just south of the bridges.

I recently came across the Old Maps app and downloaded it to root around in its archives. If you haven’t explored it, you might find it helpful. The maps are dated on the thumbnails.

On it, I found a 1944 map of the Bayeaux and Caen area with a link to a digital copy at the British Library online. Here’s the link -
France 1 : 50,000 [GSGS 4250 AMS M762], Caen

The thicker orange lines are major roads. Target C-2 (the target of Boxes I and III) (24 of the 36) was the point at which a major E-W road intersects the Falaise Highway. Target C-1 is where the same E-W road intersects the major road to the left of the Falaise Highway. On this map, you can see how Box II identified the wrong intersection, just south of the actual C-1 target. If we’d had this map, it would’ve saved us a lot of time.

There are other maps of the coastline and just inland that you’ll want to explore if you haven’t seen them already. Several from 1943 and 1944?with lots of detail and legends.

Merry Christmas and Happy Holidays,

Jan

please excuse typos. On phone, no glasses.

 

Hi, Pat,

yes. Will take screen shots and mark the aiming points for the two targets and where the bombs actually struck. Give me a day or two.

Very happy to have found this map.

Jan

 

Hi, everyone,

I need some help. If anyone has a tool to identify a specific location by its longitude and latitude map coordinates, I'm trying to identify the location of 4900N, 0016W. These are the map coordinates of the point at which the 323rd began its bomb run into Caen on the afternoon of D-Day. An abstract of the planned route is below.



I tried to back into the location using a free tool, which led me to -



There was a railway line just west of the D40 that ran parallel to and then immediately adjacent to the D40 into Caen. If this location for the initial point is correct, it's safe to conclude they flew up the D 40 to their targets - two highway junctions in Caen that were e probably major highway choke points on the D40, itself. I've got the main candidates plotted on a map, but want to hold off on posting them until we're certain about the location of the initial point with respect to roads and rail lines.

Thanks in advance for your help. You guys are probably old hands at this.

Thanks,

Jan

 

Happy New Year, Pat!

Thank you for taking the time to do this. After posting this request, I realized it might’ve been easier to pull out an atlas with map coordinates to figure this out.

This location - on the N158- definitely fits for Box I, and the route map from NA drawn by Capt. Siegel (who was the 456th Squadron Navigator on Lt. Col. Barker’s crew until July 1944). The strike photo showing hits along the Rue St. Jean from Rue de Carmen (Cathedral St. Jean) down to a couple of cross streets just north of the Orne River are in this flight path. Same for the strike photo near the cemetery south of the Orne River. This confirms that at least Box I flew straight up the N158 (Falaise Highway). Once the Box made the turn at the initial point (the coordinates noted above), the bombardier took control of the aircraft, working under extreme time pressure to (a) get the aircraft flying straight and level and (b) line the target up on his Norden bomb sign. Once he and the pilot got the aircraft straight and level, the bombardier worked furiously to get the lines on his bomb sight to cross over the target by correcting for air speed, drift, and wind speed. Most of this was done by quacking mental calculations and charts.

The flight plan for this mission gave the lead bombardiers two minutes total to level the aircraft. Of that, no more than 45 seconds was allocated to the actual bomb run. (See Siegel's report.) As it turned out, they only had one minute from the turn up the N158 to make all of this happen. (Se Siegel's report.) This tells us that they were about halfway up the planned bomb run when they made the turn onto the N158. This was due to either difficulty in finding the target or the flak Siegel reported after the turn at Mezidon.

Remember that they were flying at 3,900 feet. (See Siegel's report.) Their usual bombing altitude was between 11,000 and 12,000 get, which is the altitude they'd bombed from since the 322nd's disastrous mission to Ijuiden, Holland a year earlier. (Bombing was at low altitude. Every B-26 went down over the target. All crew members were lost.) At that altitude, light flak could reach the formation and be just as deadly as heavy flak at their usual altitude. It would've been easier for the flak gunners to hit their targets, because of the shorter surface to air trajectory. Which is all to say that the 323rd's crews were rattled. My dad once said, "War is chaos." He also said, "The flak was really bad", grimacing as he recalled it. So, that's the picture from Mezidon until they cleared the coast.

The definitive piece of evidence about the exact location of their two targets - RJ C-1 and C-2- again comes from Capt. Siegel. He describes the as “Choke Roads”, of which there are two primary. (See Siegel's navigation map. Photos and slides not uploading properly. Will have to send this to you in a power point presentation via e-mail.)

There are two possibilities for C-2, which are identified in the power point slides. Both would've been prime candidates-

Quai Amiral - Hamlin + N158

or

D40 (Rue de Auge) + N158

The intersection of the Quai Amiral - Hamlin and the N158 makes the most sense if the objective was to slow the XII SS Panzer Division's movement by road through Caen to the coastal defenses. However, intersection of the N158 and the D40 is another good possibility; a number of roads and a double track rail line intersect very close to that intersection. If I had to guess, the Quai Amiral - Hamlin and the N158 was their target.

Looking at the strike photo from National Archives through the lens of the accuracy assessments of the 9th AF and the 323rd, I believe the strike photo shows the impact points of the bombs dropped by the third flight of four in Box I. Their bombs of the flight lead hit around and just south of the intersection of the Rue de Carmen and the Rue St. Jean (the N158). The bombs of the planes in the 2, 3, and 4 slots fell just behind the bombs of the flight lead n a cross or plus sign shaped pattern (reflecting their formation). The center of impact would've been about 600 feet north of the target, which lines up with the bomb accuracy assessments of the 9th AF and the 323rd.


In the top left corner of the strike photo, clouds or smoke can be seen drifting into and across the frame in a southerly direction from a point somewhere around the Chateau. Because Siegel notes that visibility was clear under the cloud base, it's likely that it's smoke from impact of the bombs dropped by the first flight of four in Box I. The bombing accuracy assessments bu the 9th AF and the 323rd are different for that flight. The 9th AF indicates a center of impact 3,700 feet north of the target (the 3 and 7 in that number are my best guess as the typeface is very difficult to read), putting them somewhere around the Chateau. The 323rd indicates a center of impact 1,20 feet north of the target, putting them about 600 feet north of the intersection of the Rue St. Jean and the Rue De Carmens. The fact that we don't see strikes in that area in the National Archives strike photo suggests one of two things - either the target was the intersection of the N158 and the D40 or the 9th AF assessment is accurate in identifying the center of impact as somewhere around the Chateau.

Before going further, it's worth noting that he 323rd bombed in flights of four on this mission, perhaps for the first time. When the B-26 crews of the 9th Bomber Command were given the task of carrying out the bridge campaign, they perfected a new technique of bombing in flights of six - three flights per box of 18 aircrafts.

The highway and , particularly, the railway bridges at the time were narrow suspension bridges. As you know, bombs don’t fall in a plumb lune. They fall at an angle. The bombardiers could be dead on in their accuracy and still have the bombs fall through the spans without hitting the bridge. Hence bombing by “independent” flights of six.

The bridges were among the most fiercely defended targets. Flak was typically intense. By bombing in flights of six, the flights could come at the target from different directions making it more difficult for the Germans to shoot them down.

The fact that the 323rd bombed RJ C-1 and C-2 in flights of four tells us how difficult and significant these targets were. It also tells us they tried to minimize collateral damage given the location of the targets. A marshaling yard - an open space the tracks and repair sheds - is easier to identify and hit without a lot of collateral damage. A road junction in the center of town with buildings along the road is a different story. That fell apart after the turn at Mezidon.

The bombing accuracy assessments suggest that two of the boxes f(I and III) flew up the N158 and that one of the boxes (II) flew up the D40. I don’t have enough evidence to know if this was planned or the result of the “moderate to intense” light flak they caught after the turn at Mezidon. ("Light" refers to the size of the anti-aircraft surface to air shell.)

“Moderate to intense” was used in other missions to describe “flak so thick you could walk across it”, and we can assume from the aircraft that was shot down and the eight or so others that were hit, that the flak disrupted the formation. When that occurred, the aircrews only had a short amount of time to regroup. That’s when they typically got knocked off course and identified the wrong target.

As an example, on May 25, the 323rd was sent to bomb the Saaring RR Bridge in Liege. Just outside the target, they got caught up in “moderate to intense fairly accurate heavy” flak. Chaos ensued as two-thirds of the 36 aircraft were hit. My dad, bombing for one of the flights of six, bombed the railway bridge at Maastricht (30 miles up river) thinking it was the bridge the were to hit in Liege.

Whether by design or disruption, I do believe some of the flights flew up the D40, while others flew up the N158.

I’m sorting it out on power point slides. When done, I’ll send the entire presentation to you. I think you’ll enjoy seeing the original mission records, which show the precision with which the 323rd planned and executed its missions. Unfortunately, I'm not able to upload the images here, which would be easier for you to analyze.

Thank you for identifying the location of the coordinates - a key piece of evidence.

More to follow.

Jan

 

It's letting me upload directly from photos, but not from photos on power point slides. Will try again.

Above is an abstract of a map of Caen from the British Library online. It's described as an "Ordinance Map", and its date is listed as December 1943. This suggests it's a military map that was produced six months prior to D-Day. It shows the major roads with thick red lines. Double rail lines are shown with thick black lines. Single rail lines with thin black lines with small dashes.

We know that two of the three boxes flew up the N158, which crosses over the Orne River on bridge identified on the map below as C-2. (Hans posted this map some time ago, if I'm remembering correctly.)

​

Siegel identifies the targets as "choke roads" on his navigation map. Knowing that Boxes I and III flew up the N158, the most obvious choke point on the map Hans posted is the point at which it (Rue de Vaucelles) intersects the Quai Amiral. That intersection is a true choke point in the sense that there's no way to detour around it.

However, there are two other viable candidates for RJ C-2. The most obvious is the intersection of the N158 with the straight major road that it inspections just south of the marshaling yard. There are a couple of reasons to believe this was the target. First, it's a major intersection on the ordinance map above, and it lines up with the C-2 bridge and the bomb run up the N158. Second, it's almost exactly one kilometer north of that intersection, which puts it in the near vicinity of the center of impact of the bombs dropped by Box I, 1st four. (9th AF identifies the center of impact as 3,700 feet north of the aiming point along road "T". The 323rd puts the center of impact as 1,200 feet north of the aiming point along road "T".) On the map Hans posted above, you'll notice a very small letter that appears to be a "t" just above the Rue de Singer. That is the center of impact of the bombs shown in the strike photo below.



If you look closely, you'll see the N158 / Rue St. Jean, which runs at a diagonal in the image. The bombs hit in a cross shaped pattern (a "+" as opposed to a "X", which is the formation in which the four were flying, If this strike photo is in fact for Box I, 1st four, the bombs of the Lt. Col. Barker crew, flying in the number "1" or group lead position, hit just south of the Cathedral Saint Jean at the intersection of Rue St. Jean and Rue de Carmen. The bombs of the two flying off his wings fell along the Rue de Singer on either side of the Rue St. Jean. The bombs of the number 4 aircraft in the Deputy Group Lead slot fell just north of the river along the Rue St. Jean. My father was in the number "4". Capt. Wolfendon was the bombardier in the number "1". It wold make sense that the strike photo for the Group Lead would make it into the National Archives.

You'll remember this still from the Reuters footage of this mission.



The screen shot is upside down - South at the top and North at the bottom. The N - S road along which the bombs are exploding is the N158 1st south of the cemetery, which is in the bottom right quadrant of the screen shot. The 323rd assessments indicated that the center of impact of the bombs of Box I, 3rd four hit 600 feet _ of desired MPI (typeface hard to read - could be S or N on the 323rd report), while the 9th AF says 600 feet North of the desired MPI. This still shows the bombs hitting about 600 feet South of the target I identify as the second most likely.



Here's where this theory runs into problems. The 9th AF assesses the bombs of Box I, 2nd four as hitting I mile southeast of the desired MPI with the bombs of the 1 and 4 aircraft in that flight scoring "direct hits on the target of the 391 BG, a highway bridge." The 323rd's assessment indicates that the 1 and 4 scored direct hits on C-3, a bridge" as a German APV was crossing it. That would put the 323rd's targets 1 mile Northwest of the C-5 bridge that the 391st BG was targeting. That would put the C-2 target at the the N158 dead ends into the Chateau. That intersection, however, doesn't make a lot of sense was a "choke" road. The only way I've been able to harmonize the assessment for the Box I, 2nd four is to assume that they confused north with south. Interestingly, the intersection of the N158 and the Rue de Harcourt / Boulevard Le Roy *which I identified as the second possibility for RJ C-2) is about one kilometer ( a little less than 1 mile) southeast of the C-3 bridge

(Note - The 391st followed the 323rd into their targets. Normandy in the Time of Darkness states that the 323rd bombed Caen on D-Day with 72 aircraft, dropping 288,000 pounds of bombs on Caen. It identifies their targets as the four bridges over the Orne. The facts are as follows - The 323rd sent 36 aircraft to Caen. They were targeting road junctions, not bridges. They dropped 72 500 pound GP bombs and 1 leaflet bomb. 36,000 pounds or 18 tons total. The 391st BG, another B-26 BG of the 9th AF, followed the 323rd into Caen. At least one of their targets was the C-3 bridge. Most likely they were to hit no more than two of the bridges over the Orne. The 391st would-be sen 36 aircraft on this mission. It was significantly less experienced than the 323rd, with about one-third of the 323rd combat operational time. The 391st bombed in flights of six.)

 

The 323rd's assessment for Box III, 2nd four might confirm that C-2 was one of the options I've identified. "Center of impact XX,000 feet XX of desired MPI. Loose concentration. Bombs hit in grandstand of a football field, on streets and houses, and on what appears to be a garage or warehouse. Two German APVs are parked alongside the building.



There's a stadium north of the west end of the Hippodrome, which might be the football field. However, it's not along the N158 flight path. It would be on the flight path if that flight had flown up the D40. Because the third box lost its lead and was shot up so badly after the turn to Mezidon, it's surprising that any of the flights in that box managed to bomb. It shows how committed the aircrews were to carrying out the mission even as the aircraft around them were hit and thrown off course.

Tomorrow, I'll tackle Box II and attempt to harmonize this photo with the intersection of the N158 and Route Harcourt as target C-2. You'll notice that the intersection of the Rue St. Jean and Rue de Singer have not been hit, although smoke appears to be drifting up form another point. Sigh.

 

Screen shot of a flight of four With Tailed Marauders. 6 June 1944. Perhaps the only time they flew in flights of four.

 

Pat,
The most specific strike information we have is for Box I, 1st four --- the Group lead Flight. Both the 9th AF and the 323rd assessments say that the center of impact of the bombs of the four aircraft in that flight was road "T", which is the Rue de Singer. That matches perfectly with the strike photo that I got from National Archives. That puts the center of impact either 1,200 or 3,700 feet away from the aiming point.

The other key piece of information is that the bombs that struck the closest to the aiming point were those of Box I, 3rd four, which landed 600 feet North or the aiming point. The evidence seems to indicate that the assessments reversed North and South. I think the bombs hit 600 feet South of the main aiming point. That would put the aiming point as this junction (Route de Harcourt and the N 158).

I believe this is the strike photo from Box I, 3rd 4. You may recall spending some time analyzing it a while back. The intersection I believe is C-2 is just out of the frame in the bottom left hand corner of the screen shot. The cross road is the road on the north perimeter of the cemetery. Please not that the screen shot is upside down in the sense that South is at the top and North is at the bottom, with east on the left, and so on.

 

I've been fixated on the RJ mentioned above, but perhaps its was the point at which the N158 merges with another road leading up from the South. That would put the center of impact 600 feet North of the intersection, as the assessment notes.

But if that's the case, what was Highway Bridge C-3 - one of the targets of the 391st - hit by two of the aircraft in Box I, 2nd 4?

 

The center of impact for Box I, 3rd four was about 600 feet North of the RJ marked above with an arrow.

Each box is one square kilometer, which places the center of impact of Box I, 1st four about 3,700 feet North of the RJ marked with an arrow.

So far so good.

But then we have the center of impact for Box I, 2nd four 1 mile SE of the aiming point, with the bombs of two aircraft (flight and deputy flight leads - 1 and 4) hitting Highway Bridge C-3. The C-3 bridge is about 1 mile NE of the road junction marked with an arrow just above

 

Here's a screen shot from the same footage showing strikes in a completely different area. Have not started to identify it yet

 

Two racks of 4 500 lb. GP falling (total of 8 per aircraft).